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TOWARD A STRICTER ORIGINALITY
STANDARD FOR COPYRIGHT LAW
Abstract: In order to be copyrighted, a work of art must be 'original."
Critics have persuasively argued that copyright law, at various phases in
its evolution, has defined originality by applying a Romantic conception
of authorship, according to which the author creates out of a wholly
personal, original self. But, in contrast to the idealized, Romantic work,
an actual work need only exhibit an "extremely low" level of originality
in order to merit copyright protection. This Note attempts to resolve
this apparent tension between theory and practice, arguing that the
Romantic conception of authorship underlies the law's low originality
standard. Further, the Note argues that the modern understanding of
authorship, which recognize's that the outside world shapes the author's
consciousness, furnishes a more appropriate model for originality
jurisprudence. Accordingly, the Note concludes, a stricter originality
standard is needed, which would serve to reinvigorate the public
domain while protecting truly original works.
INTRODUCTION
In order to be copyrighted in the United States, an item must be
an original work of authorship. 1 This statutory requirement is implied
in the Constitution's Copyright Clause, which authorizes Congress to
protect the "writings" of "authors" so as to "promote the Progress of
... the useful Arts."2 Originality is "the very 'premise of copyright
law.'" In 1991, the United States Supreme Court stated the current
originality standard: "Original, as the term is used in copyright, means
only that the work is independently created . . . and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity."4 In order for a work to be
copyrighted, it need only exhibit an "extremely low" level of original-
ity.3
1 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, a 8; see Russ Versteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 Wm. & MARI.
L. Rix., 801, 802-03 (1993).
'Feist. Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
I See id. at 345.
5 See id.
193
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But what constitutes "an original work of authorship" remains
unclear.6 As copyright's foundational, defining premise, the original,
ity doctrine first requires a thorough articulation, and, second, must
delimit the boundary between a truly original work and a work that
exhibits a marginal contribution by the putative author.' However, the
doctrine has encountered difficulties on both fronts. 8 Although courts
and commentators have necessarily come to multiple conclusions re-
garding the originality of particular works, these often lack an ade-
quate, conceptual clarity, since courts view the doctrine with "blurred
vision."9
 Moreover, by setting the originality standard at such a low
level, the law has eviscerated much of the doctrine's force, granting
copyright protection to many works whose originality is question-
able. 1° The doctrine has. necessarily "fenced off" much of the public
domain through propertizing arguably nonoriginal works." In this
manner, the low standard for originality has proven instrumental in
expanding American copyright protection and concomitantly eroding
the public domain. 12
One strand of legal scholarship has persuasively argued that this
expansion reflects a powerful, often unacknowledged deference to
the "Romantic conception of authorship."15 The very purpose of
copyright law is to protect authors; therefore, the scope of copyright
protection reflects the degree to which the law respects authorship."
Not surprisingly, courts approach copyright cases by applying their
intuitive understanding of the author as a creator in the mold of
eighteenth and nineteenth century Romantic authors, who use
"words, musical notes, shapes, or colors to clothe impulses that come
from within reach author's] singular inner being." 15 Since courts are
likely to emphasize the putative artist's subjectivity and the uniqueness
6 See Versteeg, supra note 2, at 803-04.
See id.
8
 See id.
9
 See id.
1 ° See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1008 (1990).
" See id. at 966-67.
12
 See, e.g., id.; Davit! Lange,' Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw fit CoNTEmP. PRODS.
156, 156 (1981); Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Properly, 75 TEX. L.
Roy. 873, 886-87 (1997); Hannibal Travis, Comment, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure:
Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, BERKELEY TECH. U. 777, 813-25 (2000).
Is See, e.g., James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail,
and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1466-67 (1992); Litman, supra 'tote 10, at 1008-
09.
11 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 966-68, 1008-09.
15 See Litman, supra note 10, at 1008-09.
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of his or her creation and de-emphasize elements of his or her work
that come from the outside world, works are likely to receive extensive
copyright protection. 16
At first glance, however, the law's permissive standard seems to
clash with the Romantic model. 17 By conceptualizing artistic creation
in terms of the distinctive, Romantic individual, one would expect the
law to deny copyright protection for more mundane works." Indeed,
most critics of Romantic authorship encounter some difficulty in in-
terpreting originality jurisprudence on account of this apparent ten-
sion between theory and legal practice." One school of thought ar-
gues that the law's currently low originality standard is one feature of
copyright law which reflects a twentieth century abandonment of the
Romantic conception." A second school of thought sees a common
ground between the Romantic model and the legal standard. 21
This Note extends the second school's approach by arguing that
the Romantic conception of authorship lies behind the law's deferen-
tial approach to originality. 22 It further argues that a stricter originality
standard more accurately reflects modern society's understanding of
authorship and would serve the salutary goal of a reinvigorated public
domain." Part I discusses the cases that have most furthered the de-
velopment of originality jurisprudence, along with recent cases that
illustrate the current state of the doctrine." Part H presents the
threshold problem of how a theory criticizing Romantic authorship
can legitimately claim to explain originality jurisprudence even
though these cases never explicitly refer to theory." Part III discusses
various criticisms of the Romantic conception of authorship and its
legal consequences, while Part IV explores the policy considerations
of copyright protection and the public domain." Part V analyzes and
critiques these cases and criticisms, concluding that a stricter original-
ity standard is appropriate. 27
16 See, e.g., Boyle, supm note 13, at 14(16-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 966-68, 1008-09.
17 See Peter Jaszi, Toroaril a 'Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991
DUKE L.J. 455, 461-63, 482-85 (1991).
is See id. at 482-85.
/ 9 See id.
219 See id.
st See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
92 See id.
29 See Litman, supra note 10, at 966-68.
24 See infra notes 31-107 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 108-152 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 153-242 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 243-305 and accompanying text.
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At the outset, it is best to recognize the many other theoretical
approaches for understanding copyright law. 28 This Note cannot pre-
tend to offer an overarching theoretical explanation for the develop-
ment of American originality jurisprudence. 29
 Rather, it selectively
traces one theoretical thread that has exerted, and still exerts, a pow-
erful influence. 38
I. ORIGINALITY CASE LAW
Four cases illustrate the development of contemporary American
originality jurisprudence." Although they span over a century, the
conceptual structure underlying them is consistent, and has fostered
the development of a uniformly loose standard. 32
A. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony
In 1884, in Sarony, the United States Supreme Court held that a
photograph of Oscar Wilde was sufficiently original to merit copyright
protection." The defendant, an entrepreneur who had made and
sold copies of the photographs, argued that his actions'could not con-
stitute copyright infringement because the photograph was merely a
mechanical reproduction of an exterior event, rather than a copy-
rightable, original creation. 34 The Court first considered the thresh-
old question of whether photographs were per se uncopyrightable,
since they are not "writings," and thus are not expressly covered by
the Constitution.35
 Noting that the applicable statute protected "maps
and charts" in addition to texts, the Court found a broad meaning in
the Constitution's language and in Congress's efforts at implementing
28 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325-26 (1989); Lemley, supra note 12, at 895.
29 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 325-26; Lemley, supra note 12, at 895.
34/ See, e.g., Landes & Posner, MOM note 28, at 325-26; Lemley, supra note 12, at 895.
31 See Feist Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Seri.% Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-347 (1991); Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-52 (1903); Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54-55, 60 (1884); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,
191 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1951); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and
Collective Creativity, in THE CoNs-ritucrtoN OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN
LAW AND LITERATURE 36-90 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); Alfred C.
Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV., 247, 267-75 (1998).
32
 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-52; Sarony, 111 U.S. at 54-55,
60; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 104; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
33 1 I I U.S. at 54-55, 60.
34 Id. at 56, 59.
33 Id, at 56-59.
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the authority of the Copyright Clause: "Congress very properly has
declared [copyrightable "writings"] to include all forms of writing,
printing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in the mind of
the author are given visible expression."" The relevant concern, then,
was not the means chosen to express the author's idea, but rather, the
originality of that idea's expression."
By the same token, the Court held that photographs are not per se
copyrightable, since some photographs might not evidence the requi-
site "facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and
conception on the part of the author."" The Court applied an origi-
nality test that focused upon the author's subjective, creative contribu-
tion." The photograph in question was judged to be "an original
work of art" by virtue of the author's efforts in giving "visible form" to
his "original mental conception."40 According to the Court, these ef-
forts included posing the subject in a particular way, choosing and
arranging the costume and accessories, and making use of light and
shade.41 In addition, the Court found it significant that the photo-
graph itself possessed artistic merit, being "useful, new, harmonious,
characteristic, and graceful."42
B. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.
Bleistein provided the foundation for modern American original-
ity jurisprudence.43 In this case, decided in 1903, the Supreme Court
found that certain circus advertisements were original for copyright
purposes." Employees of the plaintiff had prepared three chromo-
lithographs—colored images fixed on a stone or metal plate—depict-
ing the owner of the circus in one corner, along with various scenes
from the circus. 45 The first lithograph portrayed "an ordinary ballet,"
the second depicted a family performing on bicycles, and the third
showed people "whitened to represent statues."46
36 Id. at 57-58.
37 See id.
" Sarany,111 U.S. al 59-60.
" See id. at 60.
4° Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
42 See 188 U.S. at 249-52; Boyle, supra note 13, ;4 1466-67,
44 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248,252.
43 Id. at 248.
46 Id.
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The Court first reiterated its Saxony holding that the mechanical
nature of lithographic production did not bar copyrightability. 47 The
Court rejected the contention that the lithographs were unoriginal
merely because they represented objective entities, as opposed to an
artist's subjective view Of them. 48 Although mere copies of circus
scenes, these works nonetheless contained the artist's personal im-
print, and thus were original. 49 The Court's reasoning foregrounded
authorial subjectivity:
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon na-
ture. Personality always contains something unique. It ex-
presses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there
is a restriction in the words of the act. 50
The Court flatly rejected the notion that originality should be
decided with reference to the artistic merits of the work. 51 Since
judges and juries cannot be presumed to be experts in aesthetic mat-
ters, the Court reasoned, it would be a "dangerous undertaking" for
them to make aesthetic value judgments.52 On the one hand, certain
works, such as Goya's etchings or Mallet's paintings, might he novel
masterpieces, but be found noncopyrightable because the public, in-
cluding judges, might not appreciate an aesthetic approach to which
they are not yet accustomed. 53 On the other hand, the Court noted,
judges are likely to have more elevated tastes than the public as a
whole, and might deny copyright to works whose commercial value
merits protection, even if their aesthetic quality is questionable. 54
Given the indeterminacy of aesthetics, the Court reasoned, economic
value provides a more reliable criterion for determining a work's legal
status. 55
The Court constructed this foundation for originality jurispru-
dence by melding a "personality" theory of artistic creation with a
47 Id. at 249.
15 See id.
'15 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50.
50 Id, at 250.
51 See id. at 251-52.
52 See id.
55 See id. at 251.
5' 1 See Bleislein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.
55 See id.
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skepticism about aesthetics in legalyeasoning. 56 The grounding crite-
rion for originality is an irreducible, unique personality in the person;
in creating a work, even a mere "copy" of an object, the artist projects
that irreducible core onto nature, such that the work necessarily bears
the imprint of the artist, and no one else. 57 The Bleistein test does not
consider the novelty or creativity of the work, but rather the presence
or absence of the putative artist's personal expression. 58 Given the
dangers of judicial aestheticizing, the Court implied, the law should
not examine the degree to which the work bears this personal im-
print, but should only ask whether it exists. 59 However, this question is
loaded, for the Court posited that any work created by an author nec-
essarily expresses the artist's personality." By presuming the original-
ity of any work that is actually produced by an individual—as opposed
to a machine—the Bleistein Court provided the conceptual structure
underlying an exceedingly low originality standard."
C. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.
In 1951, in Catalda, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit applied the Bleistein standard in finding that mezzotint
engravings, which constituted "fairly realistic reproduction Es] of oil
paintings," were original." The defendant had produced lithographs
of the plaintiffs mezzotints, and argued that this action could not
constitute copyright infringement because the mezzotints were not
original, and therefore not copyrightable at all." The trial court had
noted that the purpose of the mezzotint engraving process was to
faithfully reproduce various eighteenth and nineteenth century mas-
terpieces, "so that the basic idea, arrangement, and color scheme of
each painting are those of the original artist."" However, it was impos-
sible to make an exact reproduction.65 After placing au image of the
painting on a copper plate, "the engraver then scrapes with a hand
64 See id. at 249-50,251-52.
57 See id. at 249-50.
68 See id.
" See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52.
Go See id. at 249-50. The Court accentuated the l u ri n g 1 ny asserting that ordinary hand-
writing expresses the "author's" personality, and is thins copyrightable. Id.
61 See id,; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
62 See Catalda, 191 F.2(1 at 104,106; Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 74 F.
Stipp. 973,975 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Catalda, 74 F. Stipp. at 974-75.
64 Id. at 975.
" Id.
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tool the picture upon the plate, obtaining light and shade effects by
the depth of the scraping of the roughened plate."66 According to the
trial court, then, the scraping process required the "individual con-
ception, judgment and execution" of the engraver in determining the
depth and shape of the depressions formed, thereby engendering
Bleistein uniqueness.67
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court affirmed, holding that the
Bleistein test can be satisfied even if, as here, the author was attempt-
ing to perfectly reproduce another work, rather than create an origi-
nal work of his or her own. 68 The court expressed the originality re-
quirement as "little more than a prohibition of actual copying." 69 If
the item exhibits a "distinguishable variation" from another work, the
law presumes that such a variation bears the imprint of the author's
person, thereby entitling the work to copyright protection." Even if
the variation is accidental, the court held, the copier is still the origin
of that variation." The law, as the Bleislein Court made clear, looks for
a personal imprint in the work, but does not question how this im-
print came about. 72
D. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
Feist, decided in 1991, is the Supreme Court's most recent deci-
sion on the originality doctrine, and is most likely to shape the con-
tours of originality jurisprudence for the foreseeable future." In Feist,
the Supreme Court found that a phone company's white pages were
insufficiently original to warrant copyright protection. 74 The company
had published in alphabetical order the name, town of residence, and
phone number of each person who received phone service from it."
When a publishing company copied this information, the phone
company sued for copyright infringement, and the publishing com-
pany claimed that the white pages were not copyrightable because of
their nonoriginality. 76
99 Id.
G7 Id.; Bleisiein, 188 U.S. at 249-50.
69 Calalda, 191 F.al at 103-05; see Bleistrin, 188 U.S. at 249-50.
99 Calalda, 191 F.2(.1 at 103.
79 Id. at 102-03.
71 Id. at 104-05.
72 See id,; Bleislein, 188 U.S. at 249-50.
73 499 U.S. at 340; jaszi, supra note 31, at 37.
7 ' 1 499 U.S. at 363-64.
75 Id. at 342.
76 Id. a t 343-44.
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The Supreme Court posited the applicable standard: "Originality,
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was inde-
pendently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativ-
ity."77 The Court also situated its reasoning within the Sarong} and
Bleistein scheme by emphasizing that the author's personal contribu-
tion, rather than the work itself, is the clispositive criterion." In order
to illustrate the point, the Court considered a hypothetical: Two poets
write identical poems, but neither is aware of the other." "Neither
work is novel," the Court wrote, "yet both are original and, hence,
copyrightable."80
The Court noted.that facts, because they do not owe their origin
to an author, are not copyrightable; therefore, the phone company's
white pages were potentially open to copyright protection only as
compilations of facts, rather than by virtue of the facts themselves. 81
Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines a copyrightable
compilation as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or ar-
ranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship."82 These white pages, according to the
Court, were unoriginal, because the phone company's selection, co-
ordination, and arrangement of facts did not exhibit the requisite
"minimal creative spark."83 First, the company selected the "most basic
information"—the name, town of residence, and phone number of
each person.84 These choices were "obvious," given the self-evident
purpose of the white pages, and this very plainness evidenced a lack
of creativity. 83 Second, the company's coordination and arrangement
of these facts was similarly lacking in creativitY. 88 By simply listing the
subscribers in alphabetical order, the company utilized a common-
place, "age-old practice." 87
77 Id. at 345.
78 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Sarony, 111 U.S. at 59-60.
79 See Mg, 499 U.S. at 345-46. - -
8° Id.
gi Id. at 347,361-62.
82 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
89 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-64.
94 Id. at 362-63.
an Id.
88 1(1. at 363.
87 Id.
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On both fronts, the Court constructed a dichotomy between the
distinctive, creative process and the everyday practice of reverting to
pre-existing modes of selection, coordination, and arrangement. 88 In
introducing the requirement of creativity, the Court apparently re-
jected the Calalda court's contention that artistic intention is not re-
quired.89 Nonetheless, the Court made it clear that requiring a modi-
cum of creativity had not rendered the originality standard any less
permissive."
E. Recent Originality Cases
A number of instructive originality opinions have been rendered
since Feist, but two cases from the United States Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals stand out: Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing En-
terprises and Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. 91 These two decisions illustrate
the law's continued adherence to the low standard for originality de-
lineated above.92
1. Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterpises
In Key Publications, decided in 1991, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second' Circuit found that yellow page listings in a
telephone directory were original for copyright purposes.93 A busi-
nessperson had produced the directory and had chosen certain busi-
nesses to be included therein. 94 In particular, businesses of particular
interest to the Chinese-American community in New York City were
selected. 95 The entries were categorized." While many of the catego-
ries were common to most such directories (for example, "AC-
COUNTANTS"), some were likely to be of particular interest to the
relevant community (for example, "BEAN CURD & BEAN SPROUT
SHOPS"). 97
99
 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-64.
99 See id. at 345-46; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 104-05.
" See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
91 EtS410kin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000); Key l'obl'ns, Inc. v.
Chinatown Today Pubrg Enter., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
" See lEls-llokin, 225 F.Sd at 1076-77; Kty Pubrits,945 F.2d at 512-13.
93 See945 F.2(1 at 511,514.
9'1 id. at 511.
99 Id. at 513-14.
" Id. at 514.
97 Id.
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The court applied the Feist standard, finding that the selection
and arrangement of the listed businesses into categories evidenced
the "de minimus thought" necessary to satisfy the originality stan-
dard.98 According to the court, choosing certain businesses and ex-
cluding others required "thought and creativity," as evidenced by the
businessperson's decision to exclude businesses which she believed
would not be in business for much longer. 99 Moreover, choosing cer-
Lain categories and arranging the businesses under them was not
"mechanical," but rather "involved creativity," thereby satisfying the
Feist requirement.'°°
2. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits
In Ets-Hokin, decided in 2000, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs photographs of a vodka
bottle were original." The court described the photos in some detail:
In all three photos, the bottle appears in front of a plain
white or yellow backdrop, with back lighting. The bottle
seems to be illuminated from the left (from the viewer's per-
spective), such that the right side of the bottle is slightly
shadowed. The angle from which the photos were taken ap-
pears to be perpendicular to the side of the bottle, with the
label centered, such that the viewer has a "straight on" per-
spective. In two of the photographs, only the bottle is pic-
tured; in the third, a martini sits next to the bottle.'° 2
In its analysis, the court reiterated and adopted the longstanding
view that photographs "generally satisfy" the originality require-
ment. 103 Under this view, the photographer makes a personal choice
in "subject matter, angle of photograph, lighting and determination
of the precise time when the photograph is to be taken." 104 Therefore,
the "personal influence" of the photographer inheres in the work,
making it original. 195 The court held that the plaintiff's choices about
"lighting, shading, angle, background, and so forth" exhibited more
98 Key Pubrns, 945 F.2d al 513-34; see Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
" Key Publ'ns, 945 F.2d at 513.
100 Id. at 514; see Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
101 225 F.3d at 1071,1077.
Id. at 1071-72.
103 Id. at 1073,1076-77.
104 Id. at 1076-77.
1°5 See id.; 13Ieistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50.
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than the "minimal degree of creativity" required under the Feist stall-
dard. 106 Indeed, the court accentuated this ostensibly obvious creativ-
ity by asserting it had "no difficulty" in reaching its conclusion. 107
II. ORIGINALITY JURISPRUDENCE AS THEORY
Any attempt to theorize about the foregoing cases must address a
threshold question: How may one theoretically interpret them despite
the fact that none of these cases mentions aesthetic theory?'" Indeed,
courts have explicitly considered the question, and have consistently
found aesthetic theory subjective and indeterminate, a danger to the
rigorous objectivity typically required in legal decisiontnaking. 09
One school of thought—here termed "legal aestheticism"—re-
sponds persuasively to this dilemma by uncovering the analytical iden-
tity between particular aesthetic theories and the reasoning of origi-
nality jurisprudence. 110 Even as judges in originality cases explicitly
disavow aesthetic theory, they cannot break free from it, because the
object of copyright is, by. definition, aesthetic." The logic of original-
ity jurisprudence is theoretical, but is cloaked in anti-theoretical lan-
guage. 112 In particular, originality jurisprudence has closely tracked
two schools of aesthetic theory: formalism and intentionalism. 115
The formalist school maintains that the key to understanding art
lies in explicating the effect that an aesthetic object has on a per-
son.'" But, far from miring the critic in subjectivism, this approach
calls for an analysis of the object itself, since aesthetic experience is
governed by particular laws, and "[o]bjects that cause aesthetic emo-
tions must have literal formal qualities that conform to these laws.""5
Formalist analysis, then," aims for an unprejudiced, dispassionate in-
quiry into an objective theaning.n 6 One clear advantage of formalism
is that it roughly conforms to a layperson's ordinary approach to
art. 117 However, the formalists' emphasis on forms leads to myriad
1 °6 Els-Hokin, 225 F.3c1 at 1076-77; see Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
107
 Els-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1077.
10H SeeNini, supra note 31, at 248-50.
10° See id. at 249; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.
11° Ste Yen, supra note 31, at 250,273-75.
In See id. at 247, 249-50, 273-75; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52.
112 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52; Yen, supra note 31, at 247,249-50,273-75.
115 SeeYen, supra note 31, at 273-75.
114 See id. at 253-56,261-62.
115 See id. at 253,261-62.
116 See id. at 261-62.
117
 See id. at 254,262.
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problems." 8 For example, the formal qualities of a urinal exhibited in
an art gallery do not ordinarily provoke "aesthetic emotions," but
Marcel Duchamp's "Fountain," a conceptual piece, is one of the most
famous twentieth century works of art. 118 Similarly, if two works, one
original, one a copy, were identical to the naked eye, the formalist
could not provide an account of why one is art, and the other merely
a fake. 12°
For the intentionalist critic, in contrast, the latter example pres-
ents no difficulty. 121 This school of thought. looks to the mind of the
creator. 122 Intentionalist analysis centers around ascertaining the
meaning that the author intended the work to have. 123 This approach
avoids formalisfit's contradictions, as exemplified in the two identical
works noted above, and offers the author's ostensibly objective ac-
count of his or her work, while formalism merely disguises the subjec-
tive judgments of the critic, However, intentionalism leaves much to
be desired. 124 First, it cannot account for works that are considered
aesthetic but which are not created with the requisite intent (such as
when an artist disclaims aesthetic intent, or when a beautiful form is
accidentally created). 125 Second, it effectively leads to excessive sub-
jectivism, given the difficulties in understanding another person's
mind and feelings. 126 Third, it "cheapens" our appreciation of works
by classifying as art even those instances in which a person "tries to
create art but fails miserably." 127
According to the legal aestheticist, each school provides a tenable
approach to understanding art, but, since each suffers from particular
weaknesses from which another school does not suffer, no single
school can provide one overarching, authoritative explication of
art. 128 Given this "overlapping pattern of strengths and weaknesses,"
each may be used by viewers, readers, and spectators on a case-by-case
basis. 128 This aesthetic pragmatism roughly adopts legal pragmatism's
ng See Yen, supra note 31, at 254-55,262.
119 See id. at 255.
' 2° See id.
121 See id, at 257.
122 See id. at 256-57,263.
125 See Yen, supra note 31, at 256-57,263.
1t4 See id. at 257-58.
125 See id.
MG see id.
127 See id.
128 See Yen, suppw note 31, at 260.
129 See id.
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understanding of truth as "tentative, always subject to revision as ex-
periences change and new perspectives emerge.”tso
According to the legal aestheticist, judges have constructed
originality jurisprudence by adopting one or more of these theo-
ries."' This mirror of case law and theory is evident in at least three of
the cases discussed in Part 1. 132 In Sarony, the Court rejected the no-
tion that the photograph in question was a mere reproduction of "ex-
isting objects that the photographer did not create" and emphasized
the "useful, new, harmonious, characteristic and graceful" nature of
the photograph. 15 The Court utilized au intentionalist approach by
finding originality in the photographer's choice of draperies, costume
for the subject, light, shade, and the subject's facial eXpression. 134 Ac-
cording to the Court, the photograph was a "visible form" of the art-
ist's "original mental conception," and this interpretation of the "op-
eration of a putative author's mind" is essentially a matter of
ascertaining the author's intention in making artistic choices. 135 At
the same time, however,• the Court's reference to the work's objective
qualities was a classically formalist appraisal."6
Bleistein extended the Sarony intentionalist analysis by positing the
author's unique imprint as the mark of originality, rather than con-
sidering the reproductions' similarity to an ordinary, objective
event. ► 7 However, the Bleistein Court moved away from the Sarony
Court's formalism by rejecting aesthetic merit as a criterion in decid-
ing originality.' 38
The Catalda court, according to this interpretation, rejected in-
tentionalism, instead adopting a formalist approach. 139 The "distin-
guishable variation" standard articulates the formalist response to the
dilemma of the identical but inauthentic copy: Perfectly identical cop-
ies are, in fact, physically impossible, so that even minute differences
distinguish one from the other. ► ° By looking to the work's formal
13° See id. at 251,260 & 11.15.
131 See id. at 274-75,300-01.
132 See id. at 279-75.
133 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, I 1 1 U.S. 53,59-60 (1884); Yen, supra
note 31, at 267,274.
1 " See Samny, 111 U.S. at 60; Yen, supra note 31, at 274.	 .
t5"
	 Sarony, 1 I 1 U.S. at 60; Yen, supra note 31, at 268,274.
1 " See Sarony, I II U.S. at 60; Yen, supra note 31, at 268,274.
137 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Yen, supra note 31, at 274.
138
 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52; Yen, supra note 31, at 274.
1" SeeAlfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc„ 19l F.2d 99,102-03,104-05 (2d Cir.
1951); Yen, supra note 31, at 274-75.
14° See Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03; Yen, supra note 31, at 255,275.
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qualities, one can determine whether a distinguishable variation ex-
ists, but authorial intent, by definition, is immaterial to the work's ob-
jective features. 141
For the legal aestheticist, these three cases typify a certain judicial
duplicity; while the judges in these cases avoided explicit references to
aesthetic theory, their premises are, in fact, conditioned by exactly
what they attempt to marginalize. 142 While the earliest case, Sarony,
judged aesthetic merit, it did so without reference to aesthetic theory,
and its consideration of authorial intent was phrased commonsensi-
cally. 143 Bleistein apparently moved further from aesthetics in rejecting
judicial consideration of aesthetic merit, instead relying on an osten-
sibly self-evident authorial imprint.'" Catalda's focus on "distinguish-
able variations" appeared to dispense with the theoretical indetermi-
nacies of authorial consciousness. 145
However, these courts used theory to come to these conclu-
sions. 146 The very dangers that courts have attempted to avoid—the
inherent subjectivism of aesthetics and the concomitant threat of ju-
dicial censorship—have been present all along. 147 Because neither
formalism nor intentionalism can completely explicate artistic origi-
nality, these cases remain necessarily provisional in providing a legally
adequate standard for originality. 148 In the absence of an overarching
rule, judges should remain "open-minded to alternate aesthetic sensi-
bilities."149 If a judge with a formalist prejudice against intentionalism,
for example, were to consider authorial intent in deciding originality,
his or her decision would gain another viable perspective, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood that his or her decision would promote the
flourishing of art, the prime objective of copyright protection in the
first place.'5° But as long as judges apply their preconceptions in the
name of commonsensical, rigorous objectivity, originality jurispru-
111 See Catalda, 101 F.2d in 102-03, 104-05; Yen, supra note 31, at 255,27 5.
112 SeeYen, supra note 31, at 273-75.
143 See 111 U.S. at 60; Yen, supra note 31, at 273.
144 See 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52; Yen, supra note 31, at 273-74.
143 See 101 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Yen, supra note 31, at 272-73,274.
"6 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Saratty, 111 U.S. at 00; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03,
104-05; Yen, supra note 31, at 273-75.
147 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60; Catalda, 191 17.2d at 102-03,
104-05; Yen, supra not 31, at 248,299.
149 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. al 240-50; Salm, 111 U.S. at 60; Catakla, 191 F.2d at 102-03,
104-05; Yen, supra note. S I, at 260,299.
149 See Yen, supra note 31, at 301.
139 See id. at 301-02.
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dence will remain as incomplete as any aesthetic theory that does not
confront its own shortcomings. 151
III. CRITICISM OF THE ROMANTIC CONCEPTION OF
AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT
Critics of Romantic authorship adopt the legal aestheticist's view
that the logic of the originality doctrine is the logic of aesthetic the-
ory. 152
 These critics interpret intentionalist analyses, typified by
row-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, as expressions of the Romantic un-
derstanding of authorship. 153 By defining artistic creation in terms of
the author's wholly subjective choices, the Sarony Court applied the
paradigmatically Romantic conception of the personality who creates
from out of the deepest self, without the mediation of the outside
world. 154
 One approach—here termed "Type r—associates the Ro-
mantic model with an elevated originality standard, reasoning that
judges measuring a work against the standard of the great Romantic
artist would find more mundane works to be too "commonplace: 155
Moreover, these critics explain the law's low originality standard,
typified by Alfred Bell ce co. v. Calalda Fine Arts, Inc., by interpreting
the Catalda court's formalism as a rejection of the Romantic ap-
proach. 156
 The "Type H" critic, on the other hand, regards the law's
originality standard as consistent with the Romantic mode1. 157 This
Part first delineates the criticism of the Romantic conception, pro-
ceeds to discuss the Type I school, and concludes by presenting the
Type H alternative. 158
A. Criticism of the Romantic Model, Considered Generally
Although such critics often disagree in their terms of debate and
in their interpretations of the case law and legal and philosophical
151 See id. at 260,299,300. •
152 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 481-83; Litman, supra
note 10, at 1009.
153 See 1 1 1 U.S. at 60; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; jaszi, supra note 17, at 481; Lit-
man, supra note 10, at 1008-09.
154 See 111 U.S. at 60;,Jaszi, supra note 17, at 481; Litman, supra note 10, at 1008419.
155 See jaszi, supra note 17, at 460-63, 484-85; see also Feist Millis, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,363 (1991).
156 See 191 F.2d 99,102-03,104-05 (2d Cir. 1951); jaszi, supra note 17, at 484-85; Lit-
man, supra note 10, at 1009-11.
'57 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
158 See infra notes 161-231 and accompanying text.
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commentaries, the discourse criticizing Romantic authorship main-
tains a remarkable uniformity in its essential structure. 159 For this
school of thought, the basic logic of copyright law stems from the un-
critical adoption of this particular conception of authorship, thus
leading to an overexpansion of copyright protection, whose lack of
full-fledged legitimacy follows from the flaws of the underlying con-
ceptual bias. 16° While the Romantic model envisions authorship as
"creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea," the modern view more
accurately understands authorship in terms of "translation and re-
combination." 161 In other words, the typical, cmitemporary approach
rejects the Romantic notion that the artist projects an irreducibly per-
sonal creativity onto the world. 162 This criticism of Romantic author-
ship is grounded in a substantive truth-claim about the nature of
authorship. 165
As long as one believes that there exists an inner, irreducibly sub-
jective space in which the author creates something out of nothing,
one can distinguish between the author's original creation and enti-
ties in an outside, objective world. 164 By insisting on this model of
authorial subjectivity, the law has understood the author's property in
terms of originality) 65 An originating space within the author's con-
sciousness can successfully resist others' legal claims that pose a po-
tential threat to the author's intellectual property, but only if this
original consciousness is, at bottom, utterly free from the outside
world) 66 In other words, the legitimacy of the author's claim rests
upon the primacy of the author's creativity as against all other beings
in the world, and therefore relies on a. strict separation between sub-
ject and object. 167
1 °9 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; jaszi, supra note 17, at 460-63, 481-85; Litman,
supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-11.
160 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1463-67, 1533-34; jami, supra note 17, at 460-63, 481-
85; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-11.
101 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1464-67, 1526-27; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67,
1008.
162 See Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-11.
" See id. at 966-67, 1008-11; TERRY EAGIE,TON, LITERARY THEORY 113, 129-30, 136,
138 (1983).
104 See EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-
67, 1008-09.
165 See Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09.
166 See id. at 1008-09; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
167 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 1008-09.
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This dichotomy breaks down, however, when one considers the
actual character of artistic production. 168
 No author comes to the act
of creation without having been informed by his or her experience of
the outside world, such that there is never a purely subjective space at
all. 169
 Rather, an artist translates experience into an artwork, recom-
bining the raw materials of memory and interpretation into this new
entity,'" However, the novelty of the work, insofar as it can be traced
back to the author, is not absolute, for the author's creativity can
never be considered in complete isolation from the outside world in
which the author lives."' In its most characteristic expression, con-
temporary literary thought diametrically opposes the Romantic un-
derstanding:
There is no such thing as literary "originality," no such thing
as the "first" literary work: all literature is intertextual. A
specific piece of writing thus has no clearly defined bounda-
ries: it spills over constantly into the works clustered around
it, generating a hundred different perspectives which dwin-
dle to a vanishing point. The work cannot be sprung shut,
rendered determinate, by an appeal to the author, for the
"death of the author" is a slogan that modern criticism is
now confidently able to proclaim. 172
Indeed, even if one hesitates to go so far as these modern critics, any
author clearly is influenced and conditioned, consciously and uncon-
sciously, by other workS the author has read, not to mention the
author's gender, socio-economic background, and historical milieu. 1"
For the modern sensibility, the Romantic notion of a purely personal,
utterly nonconditioned subjectivity seems overly metaphysical, even
mythological. 174
168 See EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-
67, 1008-11.
100 See EAcurroN, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-
67, 1008-11.
170 .Stv'EAGLE-roN, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965—
67, 1008-11.
171 See EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965—
67, 1008-11.
EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 138.
173 See id. at 113, 129-30, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-437, 1008-11.
171 See EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965—
67, 1008-11.
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This philosophical debate is hardly as abstract as it might seem at
first glance, because the very notion of authorship is historically con-
ditioned. 175 Before the eighteenth century, the assertion that an
author's work might constitute property on account of its originality
would have seemed fantastical, since "things of the mind" were con-
sidered distinct from "articles of transferable property." 176 Indeed, the
English, from whom American copyright law was inherited, did not
even use the word "plagiarism" until the early 17th century. 177 True
inspiration was divine, rather than human, such that humans could
only be "craftsmen."'" As mere copiers or mouthpieces, writers could
claim no proprietorship over their words.'" But, as one critic puts it,
"the elevation of the romantic author both presented and seemed to
solve the question of property rights in intellectual products." 80
"Originality" could become the defining quality of artistry only if true
artistry were defined as "emanating not from outside or above, but
from within the writer himself. "181
But how did this conception of a wholly interior and subjective
creative experience develop?' 82 The rhetoric of authorship utilized in
the Statute of Anne (1709) found a somewhat hospitable reception, in
large part because of the ascendance of "possessive individualism" in
contemporary English social thought. 183 Particularly influential was
John Locke's implicit notion that the individual, in the proprietorship
over the self, "authors" experience. 184 Similarly, Hobbes considered
"he whose words or actions are considered . . . as his own" to be a
"natural person," who owns those words or actions, and thereby "acts
by authority.' 185 The etymological connection between authorship
and authority reflects the eighteenth century conflation of these two
concepts; the author gained legal authority via "individual control
over the created environment." 186 If an individual owns himself, he
175 See EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 18; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1463-66; Jaszi, .supra
note 17, at 966-67.
179 SeeJaszi, supra note 17, at 466-67.
177 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1465-66.
175 See id. at 1463-64.
179 See id. at 1463-65.
1 fio id. at 1465.
181
 See id.
ma See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1463-67; jaszi, supra note 17, at 466-71.
159 See An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709,8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.); Jaszi, su-
pra note 17, at 968-70.
t at Seejaszi, supra tune 17, at 468-70.
159 Id. at 470.
189 See id.
212	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 43:193
authors his own experience, including the experience of creation. 187
"Possessive individualism" thus provided a critical, grounding premise
for intellectual property as such—a work's ownership is a function of
the author's individual self.' 88
This conception of owned subjectivity proved amenable to the
Romantic understanding of authorship, which was ascendant by the
late eighteenth century. 189 Criticizing the "mastery of rules extrapo-
lated from classical literature," the Romantics "preached" originality,
which they located "in the poet's own genius." 99 By combining the
notion of self-ownership with the belief that the true artist's work
sprung from his own originality, it was possible to understand literary
work as property created by the artist's own, owned genius. 191 Fichte
arguably provided the most salient philosophical response to the
problem of separating out copyrightable from noncopyrightable ele-
ments in a particular work. 192 Fichte's conception was grounded in
the dichotomy between form and substance: "Precisely because the origi-
nality of his spirit was converted into an originality of form the author re-
tains the right to the form in which those ideas were expressed."'"
Moreover, by valorizing the artist as a quasi-religious beacon of both
beauty and truth, the Romantic approach raised the stakes for copy-
right protection. 194 An originating, inner spirit thus provided the legal
justification for a powerful protection of artists' rights over their ex-
pressions. 195
B. Type I Criticism of the Romantic Conception of Authorship
The Type I critic argues that, while the Romantic model still ex-
erts influence in contemporary originality jurisprudence, the law's
permissive standard is best explained by the twentieth century trend
lc See id.
"8 See id. at 469-70; JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE 63-64 (1991). Gaines ar-
gues that the law's permissive originality standard exists independently of the Romantic
conception, because it is fundamentally grounded in Lockean labor theory: "Ulf the indi-
vidual author produces property in the work in the Lockean sense, then every act of prod-
uct is an act of origination, every work is an original work, regardless of whether it is aes-
thetically unoriginal, banal, or in some cases, imitative." 14.
189 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1465-67; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 466-67,469-70.
ISO SeeJaszi, supra note 17, at 467.
191 See id. at 466-67,469-70.
192 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
198
 See id.
194 Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466, 1467-68; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67.
195 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466, 1467-68; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 466-67, 469-70;
Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67.
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toward formalism and the concomitant distancing from the Romantic
tnodel."6 For this school of thought, the quasi-religious figure of the
great author necessarily leads to a legal bias against more mundane
producers of works. 197
Accordingly, these critics look to late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century works as the archetypal expressions of the Romantic
understanding. 198 Although a late nineteenth century opinion, Sarony
still held to this conceptual struCture.'" First, the Court found origi-
nality in the Oscar Wilde photograph by conceptualizing the photo-
graphs as "representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the
`author.'"2" This reliance on the "individual artistic genius" evidences
a Romantic conception of the work as the representation of a wholly
personal self."' Second, the Court considered the aesthetic merit of
the work. 202 For the Type I critic, this criterion echoes the Romantic
apotheosis of art and the concomitant distinction between the work
created by the truly original artist and that produced by the amateur
or the craftsman. 205
According to these critics, however, Bleistein a Donaldsori Litho-
graphing Co., marked the originality doctrine's evolution away from
this Romantic scheme." 4 While Sarony focused on the artist as the
fount of creativity, Bleistein concentrated on the work itself, thereby
eliding the author. 205 For these critics, the Court left authorship with
"little or no meaningful content" by rejecting aesthetic merit as a cri-
terion for originality. 206 If circus advertisements are given the same
legal protection as a Picasso, the'law's role in determining originality
is highly restricted, indeed. 207 The Court looked merely for some evi-
dence that the work was produced by some individual, but since every
190 See .laszi, supra note 31, at 35-36; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 481-85; Litman, supra note
10, at 1009-11.
197 See J aszi, supra note 17, at 483-85.
198 Seeiaszi, supra note 17, at 466-07.
199 See 1 I I U.S. al 60; Jaszi, supra note 17, al 480-81.
20° See 5arony,111 U.S. at 60; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 480-81.
291 See Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 480-81; Litman, supra note 10, al
965-67,1008-09.
292 See Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 480-81.
293 See Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 466-67,480-81.
294 See 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 482-83.
295 See 13Ieistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 482-
83.
299 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 482-83.
207 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 482-83.
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individual leaves a mark on something produced, the individual artist
was considered relatively insignificant. 208
For these critics, Catalda represented the most extreme, pure ap-
plication of this work-centered approach. 209 The "distinguishable
variation" test looks only to the work. 218 That an accidental variation
by a copier may be copyrighted illustrates the Catalda court's dis-
avowal of the Romantic standard for creativity; the originality of the
work appears in its distinguishing features, without any reference to
authorial subjectivity at al1. 2 " The copier who inadvertently produces
an "original" work transforms raw material, but does not "create"
from within a wholly private consciousness. 212 Even though Bleistein
and Catalda mentioned the formal, technical requirement that works
be traced back to an author, they acknowledged, in effect, "the death
of the author," as announced by contemporary literary theory. 213 The
law's permissive standard for originality reflects this effacement of
authorship.214 By understanding the requisite authorship as a mere
point of origin, modern copyright law has so generalized the concept
that it is no longer meaningful or effective. 215
The Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Court,
however, returned to the Romantic conception by arguably raising the
standard for originality. 216 By conceptualizing the legal standard in
terms of creativity, the Court returned to pre-Bleistein originality juris-
prudence, focusing on the work as a sign of "the creative powers of
the mind."217
 While Bleistein and Catalda effaced the author by setting
forth a merely formal, permissive requirement of human agency, the
Feist Court restored, to a limited degree, the Romantic conception of
authorship as the creative projection of an originary self. 218 This
208 See Bleislein, 188 U.S. at 251-52;faszi, supra note 17, at 482-83.
209 See 19I F.24 at 102-03,104-415; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 483-85; Litman, supra note
10, at 1010-11.
210 See Caialtla, 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Yen, supra note 31, at 274-75.
211 See 19I F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 483-85.
212 See Catalda, 191 F.2(1 at 104-05; Litman, supra note 10, at 1008-11.
213 See Bleislein, 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; EA-
cas.:ToN, supra note 163, at 138; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 482-85.
211 Sedaszi, supra note 17, at 482-85; Litman, supm note 10, at 1005.
215 SeeJaszi, supra note 17, at 482-85; Litman, supra note 10, at 1005.
216 See499 U.S. at 345-47; Jaszi, supra note 31, at 36-39; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 481-85.
217 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346; The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,94 (1879); Jaszi, supra
note 31, at 36-39.
216 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Bleislein, 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52; Calaida, 191 F.2d
at 102-03, 104-05; EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 138; Jaszi, supra note 31, at 36-39; Jaszi,
supra note 17, at 482-85; Litman, supra note 10, at 1008-09.
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movement toward a Romantic standard for authorship has raised the
bar for copyright protection; insufficiently creative works produced by
an individual would have received protection under Bleistein and
Catalda, but not any longer.2119
C. Type II Criticism of the Romantic Conception of Authorship
The Type II critic, on the other hand, rejects the notion that
Bleistein adopted a work-centered, anti-Romantic approach, instead
interpreting the minimal Bleistein standard as entirely consistent with
the Romantic understanding of the self as creative origin. 220 Under
this view, the theory underlying Bleistein exemplified the Fichtean
scheme. 221 By grounding copyrightability in the individual's unique-
ness, the Bleistein Court adopted the Fichtean notion of a wholly sub-
jective, distinctive originality that expresses itself in a corresponding,
original form of objective expression. 222 By concentrating on the
work's form, rather than judgingF the substantive merits of the artist's
creation, the Bleistein Court applied the Romantic model to even the
most banal, commercialized works. 225 Far from completely rejecting
the Romantic standard of genius, the Bleistein Court simply adopted
the conceptual structure underlying that standard, and applied it to
all works, no matter how inundane. 224 In other words, the Court ap-
plied the epistemology of Romantic aesthetics, but rejected the Ro-
mantic notion of a hierarchy of works based on aesthetic inerit. 225 In-
deed, as the Type I critic asserts, the low standard for originality
reflects the Bleistein Court's "generalization" of authorship; originality
means only that the work has a human being as its point of origin, as
opposed to some specifically defined authorial process. 226 However,
while the Type I critic interprets this generalization as an effacement
of the Romantic author, Type II Criticism implies that it is, in fact, an
219 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Catahla, 191 F.2t1
at 102-03,104-05; EAct.E'ront, supra note 163, at 138; Jaszi, supra note 31, at 36-39; Jaszi,
supra note 17, at 482-85; Litman, supra note 10, at-1008-09.
22° See 188 U.S. at 249-50; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1460-67.
221 See 188 U.S. at 249-50; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1460-07.
222 See 188 U.S. at 249-50; Boyle, supra. note 13, at. 14(16-67.
22s See 188 U.S'. at 249-50, 251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
224 See 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
222 See 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
226 See 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, supra note
17, at 483.
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extension of the Romantic mode1. 227 According to the Type II critic,
the generalization of authorship in Bleistein does not represent the
rejection of the Romantic understanding of authorship as personal
creation, but rather compels the Court to presume that any work, as
long as it is produced by a human actor, expresses the producer's
"originality of spirit. "228 That the Bleistein Court rejected the Romantic
apotheosis of art and artist does not change the intentionalist, Ro-
mantic structure of its analysis. 229 Paradoxically, an apparently objec-
tive formalism was, in fact, grounded in Romantic subjectivism. 2"
IV. POLICY: PROTECTING AUTHORS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The chief aim of copyright law, embedded in the Constitution, is
to promote the progress of the arts.231 Without copyright protection,
few authors or artists would have an economic incentive to sell their
works to the public; the legal propertization of the work thus fosters
the flourishing of art. 232 From this perspective, the public domain—all
works which are not so propertized—is defined negatively, as beyond
the realm of works for which public policy demands protection. 233 But
the public domain furthers significant public policy objectives of its
own. 234 Most importantly, it provides an open intellectual commons in
which discursive exchange can proceed without the burdens of legal
formalities.235 Indeed, by fencing off this commons, copyright protec-
tion limits the scope of debate and the availability of the "raw materi-
als of authorship" upon which authors build in creating their own
works; copyright protection, by definition, precludes access to works
by citizens who might profit immensely by experiencing them. 238 The
policy dimension of copyright protection expresses itself in the form
of a balancing test, as commentators weigh the benefits of protecting
227 See 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, supra note
17, at 483.
228 See 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, supra note
17, at 483.
229 See 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, supra note
17, at 483.
23° See 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
23L U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
232 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 326; Yen, supra note 31, at 248.
233 See Litman, supra note 10, at 967-68.
231 See id.; Lange, supra note 12, at 164; Travis, supra note 12, at 850-51.
235 See Lange, supra note 12, at 164; Litman, supra note 10, at 967-68; Travis, supra note
l2, at 850-51.
236 See Lange, supra note 12, at 164; Litman, supra note 10, at 967-68; Travis, supra note
12, at 850-51.
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an author's works against the benefits of a vigorous intellectual coin-
mon5.237
As many commentators have detailed, the scope and duration of
American copyright protection has expanded in recent decades.238
The law's permissive originality standard has fostered this develop-
ment. 239 By extending copyright protection to any work that evidences
the production of an individual, the originality doctrine has increased
the number of protected works beyond what was propertized in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 240 As this expansion has oc-
curred, the number of works in the public domain has necessarily
shrunk, vitiating the benefits of an intellectual commons. 241 Moreover,
it is uncertain whether the policy goal of fostering art is furthered by
protecting works that many observers regard as marginally original, at
best.242
V. TOWARD A STRICTER ORIGINALITY STANDARD
The most conspicuous critique of any theoretical approach to
originality jurisprudence is epistemological: How can the observer
know that the judicial approach is, in fact, theoretical when the judi-
cial language is expressly untheoretical?245 The critic of Romantic
authorship must respond to the skeptic's reluctance to read meaning
behind judges' words, so to speak. 244 Legal aestheticists, these critics
included, adequately justify their reliance upon theory in explaining
originality jurisprudence. 245 Indeed, the legal aesthetician simply pro-
ceeds from the pragmatic, everyday understanding of language as a
2" See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 326; Lange, supra note 12, at 164; Lit-
man, supra note 10, at 967-68; Yen, supra note 31. at 248; Travis, supra note 12, at 850-51.
2" See, e.g., Lange, supra note 12, at 156; Letuley, supra note 12, at 886-87; Travis, supra
note 12, at 813-25.
2" See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67,1525-26; Lange, supra now 12, at 156; Lemley,
supra note 12, at 886-87; Litman, supra nOle 10, at 966-67,1000; Travis, supra note 12, at
813-25.
215 See Boyle, supra note 13, an 1466-67, 1525-26; Lange, supra note 12, at 156; Lemley,
supra note 12, at 886-87; Litman, supra note 10, at 966-67,1000, Travis, supra note 12, at
813-25.
211 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67,1525-26; Lange, supra note 12, at 156; Lumley,
supra note 12, at 886-87; Litman, supra note 10, at 966-67,1000; Travis, supra note 12, at
813-25.
212 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67, 1534; Litman, supra note 10, at 966-68,1000,
1005.
"5 SeeYen, supra note 31, at 247,249-50,273-75.
211 See id.
245 See a
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representation of meanings.246
 If the reader is bound by the judge's
meanings, rather than the judge's words as such, a legal discourse
might reasonably be understood in terms of a non-legal discourse. 247
Here, for instance, the legal discourse on originality makes the same
assertions as aesthetic theory, but simply uses different words, used in
different ways. 248
 This duality allowed the Bleistein Court, for instance,
to interpret authorial originality in starkly intentionalist terms while
simultaneously disavowing theory. 249
 Originality jurisprudence impli-
cates aesthetic theory by superficially effacing it. 25°
By uncovering the logic of cases such as Sarony and Bleistein, crit-
ics have persuasively illustrated how the logic of originality jurispru-
dence mimics and performs the logic of Romantic authorship and of
itttentionalism. 251
 Fundamentally, these discourses proceed from a
particular understanding of authorial subjectivity. 252 In fact, the Ro-
mantic conception of a creative, irreducible subjectivity is the basis of
the intentionalist arguMent that a work of art should be understood
by reference to the author alone. 255 Romantic theory, by positing an
unbridgeable gap between authorial subjectivity and the objectivity of
the outside world, furnishes intentionalism with the subject-object
dichotomy without which it could not function.254 Indeed, how could
one use the author as a reliable measure of art if the author were not
immaculately independent from the ebb and flow of the outside
world?255 Otherwise, the artist would not truly be a subject, since his
or her very self would "contain" elements of the outside world. 256 In-
tentionalism could not function in such a scenario, for its premise is
216 see id.
217
 See id.
2W SeeYen, supra note 31, at 247, 249-50, 273-75.
219
 See id.; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50, 251-52
(1903).
293 See Yen, supra note 31, at 247, 249-50, 273-75.
251 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111  U.S.
53, 60 (1884); Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 480-81.
252 See EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 67; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra
note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at 256-57, 263.
253 SteEAGLE-roN, supra note 163, at 67; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-4i7; Litman, supra
note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at 256-57, 263.
221 See EAGLETON, supra note 103, at 67; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra
note 10, al 965-67,1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at 256-57, 263:
255 See EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 67; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra
note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at 256-57, 263.
256 See EACLETON, supra note 163, at 67; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra
note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at 256-57, 263.
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that the subject precedes the object, rather than the other way
around.257
The reasoning of Sarony diametrically opposed the anti-Romantic
stance of most contemporary theorists, defined by its rejection of this
subject-object premise. 259 Sarony would have been unthinkable under
the contemporary view, since it understood the work as a representa-
tion of the artist's subjective conception. 259 The very use of the word
"representations" is enough to illustrate the Romantic assumption
that the artist's work re-presents (literally, "presents again") the artist's
originary mind. 264 If the work "presents again," it is derivative; some
origin must precede it. 261 But the modern view summarily rejects the
notion that there is ever a subjective consciousness that is not also in
some way conditioned by experience of the outside world.262 Under
the modern approach, then, the work is not a re-presentation of a
pure subject, but rather bears the mark of that subject, along with the
marks of the many other texts and experiences which informed and
engendered that subject's consciousness. 265 One may disagree with
the positions of modern literary theory, but it is clearly incompatible
with the Sarony Court's subjectivism.264 The pre-modern view of crea-
tive originality, however, explains the Sarony Court's logic perfectly. 265
257 See EAGLETON, Sifpra note 163, at 67; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Lit man, StiPla
note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at 256-57, 263.
256 See St1101/y, 1 l l U.S. at 60; EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 67, 113, 129-30, 138; Boyle,
supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at
256-57, 263.
2" See Sarony, HI U.S. at 60; EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 67, 113, 129-30, 138; Boyle,
supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at
256-57, 263.
266 See Smutty, Ill U.S. at 60; EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 137, 113, 129-30, 138; Boyle,
supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at
256-57, 263.
261 See Sarony, 1 1 l U.S. at 60; EAGLETON, ROM lion; 163, at 67, 113, 129-30, 138; Boyle,
supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, .supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at
256-57, 263.
262 See Sarony, 111  U.S. at 60; EAGEETON, supra note 163, at 67, 113, 129-30, 138; Boyle,
supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at
256-57, 263.
2f'3 See Sammy, 1 I I U.S. at 60; EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 67, 113, 129-30, 138; Boyle,
supra note 13, at 14(36-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-117, 1008•)9; Yen, supra note 31, at
256-57, 263.
2" See Ill U.S. at 60; EAGLETON, SUP/7/ note 16:3, at 67, 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Boyle,
supra note 13, at 14116-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 3!, at
256-57, 263.
265 See 111  U.S. at 60; Boyle, supra. note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra mite 10, at 965-
67, 1008-09; Yen, supra note 31, at 256-57, 263.
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The Bleistein Court extended this Romantic, intentionalist logic
by locating authorship within the irreducible subjectivity of the
unique personality. 266
 The Court's language was clear: Personality
"expresses its singularity" in any individual's product, because it con-
tains "something irreducible" that belongs only to the individual. 267
Bleistein perfectly reproduced Sarony's conceptual scheme of a purely
personal, wholly subjective artist. 268
 Type I criticism fails to see that
the Court relied on the conceptual structure of intentionalist Roman-
ticism even as it rejected the notion that judges should apply a Ro-
mantic hierarchy by considering aesthetic merit. 269 This ambivalence
toward Romanticism underlies the current standard for originality;
the law presumes that a work produced by an individual bears the
Romantics' mark of pure subjectivity, but extends copyright protec-
tion to works without making the Romantic judgment of the work's
status as a revelation of beauty or truth.27° Type H criticism, therefore,
correctly articulates the essentially Romantic structure of the Bleistein
Court's epistemology, even if that Court simultaneously rejected the
Romantic hierarchy of aesthetic quality.271
Although no Type II critic has addressed Catalda, a Type II analy-
sis reveals the shortcomings of the Type I reading.272 By focusing on
the work as evidence of originality, the Type I critic claims, the formal-
ist Catalda court diametrically opposed Romantic subjectivism. 273
However, this reading ignores the fundamentally Romantic structure
of the Catalda analysis. 274 According to that analysis, the originality of
a "distinguishable variation" follows from an author's irreducible sub-
jectivity, as manifested in the work. 275 The court explicitly followed
Bleistein, and paraphrased the controlling principle: "No matter how
266 See 188 U.S. at 249-50; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
267 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
268 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Sarony,111 U.S. at 60; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-
67.
263
 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, su-
pra note 17, at 482-83.
270 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52; Ets-Ilokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3(1
1068,1076-77 (9th. Cir. 2000); Key Ptibrns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Puhrg Enter., lnc.,
945 F.2(1509,512-15 (2d Cir. 1991); Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
2" See 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
272 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,102-03,104-05 (2d Cir.
1951); Jaszi, supra note 17, at 483-85; Litman, supra note 10, at 1009-10.
273 See 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 483-85; Litman, supra note
10, at 1009-10.
274 See 191 F.2d at 102-03,104-05Jaszi, supra note 17, at 483-84.
275 See Catalda, 191 F.2 t1 at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, supra
note 17, at 469-70.
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poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his
own."276
 The court's emphasis on the artist's 'own' addition to the
work perfectly tracked Lockean and Hobbesean possessive individual-
ism, which set the condition for the Romantic conception of author-
ship in the first place.277 As in Bleistein, an analysis that rejects the Ro-
mantic genius standard hardly becomes anti-Romantic by extending
the essentially Romantic standard for uniqueness to more humble
productions. 278 Catalda followed Bleistein, phrasing the irreducible
subjectivity of Romantic uniqueness in terms of that which is the
author's 'own,' as opposed to that which can be reduced further by
separating out external elementS. 279 Catalda's grant of copyright pro-
tection to inadvertent works constituted a shift from Sarong's emphasis
upon the artist's volition, but this is hardly inconsistent with Romantic
subjectivism; accidental subjectivity is subjectivity, nonetheless. 280 No
matter how unequivocally Catalda rejected the Romantic cult of gen-
ius, this conception of the uniqueness of the author's creation stands
in stark contrast to the contemporary view, according to which artistic
production is inherently, necessarily mediated and conditioned by
nonsubjective elements. 281
The Type II approach thus reveals how the Romantic model un-
derlies both intentionalist and formalist analyses of originality in
copyright law.282 The underlying, unspoken faith in a moment of irre-
ducible, atomic subjectivity has proven so powerful that it sets the
terms for a formalist, work-centered approach that, at first glance,
might seem to he fundamentally 'opposed to the Romantic, intention-
alist conception. 283 This understanding explains what Type I criticism
cannot; the law's loose standard for originality has developed, not de-
276 Calalda, 191 F.211 at 103.
277 See Calalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle. supra now. 13. at 1466-67; jaszi, supra
note 17, at. 469-70.
278 See Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
279 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1466-67.
28° See Calalda, 101 F.26 at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
281 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Calalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; EmniToN, su-
pra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note
10, at 965-67, 1008-09.
282 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Sarony, Ill U.S. at 60; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03,
104-05; EAGucroN, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-
67.
283 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03. 104-05; Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1466-67; jaszi. supra note 17, at 482-85.
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spite the power of the ROmantic paradigm, but precisely because of it 2"
The law, in determining the originality of a given work, accords an
uncritical deference to putative authors because of the unexamined,
Romantic assumption that an artwork as such is grounded in a purely
subjective space that the law cannot and should not interrogate. 285
Examining and critiquing an author's creativity is impossible, accord-
ing to this model, because the law, as an exterior being, cannot reach
into a wholly private realm. 288
 Further, the continuing Romantic bias
of originality jurisprudence helps to explain how the law's permissive
originality standard has contributed to the ongoing expansion of
American copyright protection. 287
 While Type I criticism associates
extensive copyright protection with the Romantic reverence and re-
spect for authorship, it nonetheless interprets most modern original-
ity jurisprudence as a rejection of the Romantic model. 288 The Type II
approach resolves this tension by showing how copyright expansion
and a low originality standard have worked hand-in-hand. 289
Today, originality jurisprudence is slowly taking steps away from
this Romantic deference. 299
 While the Type I approach criticizes Feist
as a resurrection of a Romantic bias toward great, original authors,
the Feist Court's approach is more ambivalent in its orientation toward
Romanticism.291
 By insisting that the author's personal contribution,
rather than the work itself, is the dispositive criterion, the Court situ-
ated itself within the Romantic epistemology of authorial subjectiv-
ity. 292
 But in holding that the law must interrogate that subjectivity by
ascertaining the author's creativity, the Court signaled its critique of
294 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Catalda, 191 F.2(1 at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 1008-09.
285 See Bleistein, 18$ U.S. at 249-50; Catalda, 191 F.26 at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1466-67; Lit man, supra note 10, at 1008-09.
286
 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Catalda, 191 F.2(1 at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1466-67.	 •
287 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1466-67, 1525-26; Lange, supra note 12, at 156; Lettiley, supra note 12, at $86-
87; Litman, supra note 10, at 966-67, 1000; Travis, supra note 12, at 813-25.
1193 SeeJaszi, supra note 17, at 461-63, 482-85.
289 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1466-67, 1525-26; Lange, supra note 12, at 156; Lentley, supra note 12, at 886-
87; Litman, supra note 10, at 966-67, 1000; Travis, supra note 12, at 813-25.
299 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-46, 362-63; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
291 See 499 U.S. at 345-47; Jaszi, supra note 31, at 36-39; jaszi, supra note 17, at 461-63,
482-85.
292 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-17; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Jaszi, supra note 31, at
36-39; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 480-81.
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the deference given by the Bleistein and Catalda approaches. 293 While
the Feist criterion of creativity certainly contains echoes of the Roman-
tic insistence upon the author's autonomy, it is best read in light of
the recognition that not all works produced by an individual are crea-
tive enough to justify legal protection. 294 It is evident that an ordinary
phone book is not an "original work of authorship." 295 While the Ro-
mantic apotheosis of authorial subjectivity encouraged judicial defer-
ence, the critique of pure subjectivism, as in Feist, necessitates the op-
posite approach, encouraging judicial skepticism toward claims of
creativity. 296 No work, and no author, is free from external influences,
such that it no longer makes sense to effectively assume that a pro-
duced work contains a core of purely authorial creativity. 297 Rather,
the question of originality is one of degree: To what extent does this
work evidence artistic creativity? 298 This approach, intimated by the
Feist Court, reflects the modern view that authorship is a "more mod-
est achievement," rather than a mystical process upon which one
should not tread.299 The Feist approach signals a higher standard for
originality, since a work's insufficient creativity is now a bar to copy-
right protection, even if it would have satisfied the Bleistein require-
ment of having a point of origin.soo
The inadequacy of a loose standard for originality is most evident
in Key Publications and Ds-Hokin."' In Key Publications, constructing a
phone book was considered "creative."392 Although ostensibly apply-
ing the Feist standard, the court did not include any analysis of how
the selection and arrangement of business listings was "creative."" 3
The court's reasoning effectively returned to the Romantic deference
293 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.-50,251-52; Catalda, 191 F.2d
at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
294 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Jaszi, supra note 31, at 36-39; Jaszi, supra. note 17, at
461-63,482-85.
298 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994); Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-63.
299 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50,251-52; Calakla, 191 F.2d
at 102-03, 104-05; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67.
297 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Catalda, 191 F.2d
at 102-03, 104-05; EAGLEToNt, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Boyle, supra note
13, at 1466-67; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67,1008-09.
298 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47.
299 See id.; EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Litman, supra note 10,
at 965-67,1008-11.
309 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Jaszi, supra note
31, at 36-39; Jaszi, supra note 17, at 482-85; Litman, supra note 10, at 1008-09.
"I See Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076-77; Key Pulorns, 945 F.2d at 512-15.
902 See Key Pubrus, 945 F.2d at 512-15.
893 See Feist, 491) U.S. at 345-47; Key Publ'ns, 945 F.2d at 512-15.
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of the Bleistein decision.s°4 Under the modern, Feist view, the court
should have critically examined the phone books in order to ascertain
whether they were sufficiently creative, rather than assume a Roman-
tic, wholly subjective creativity." In all likelihood, the phone books
would not be considered copyrightable according to this critical ap-
proach, because the degree of the businessperson's artistic contribu-
tion was minimal, at best; it is hardly clear that yellow pages evidence
creative choices." Rather, the putative author complied the directory
for her customers' use, keeping in mind which businesses her pro-
spective customers would most likely frequents° Pragmatic, business
decisions are hardly "creative," but instead typify exactly what the Feist
Court has held not to he copyrightable-commonplace, ordinary
choices."
Similarly, the photographer in Ets-Hokin merely took photo-
graphs of a vodka bottle for use in an advertisement, and the weight
of his "artistic" choices appears slight." Under the modern ap-
proach, the court would have examined the photograph with an eye
toward the creativity of the photographer's choices, or lack thereof.")
in so doing, the court probably would have found that giving the
viewer a "straight on" perspective was entirely foreseeable, given ad-
vertising's obvious goal of attracting the viewer's attention."' Further,
the addition of the martini glass was entirely foreseeable and ordi-
nary, because most people associate vodka with martinis. 912 These
choices were probably within the scope of the ordinary, obvious
choices which the Feist approach neglects to protects"
See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50, 251-52; Key Publ'ns, 945 F.2(1 at 512-15; Boyle, supra
note 13, at 1466-67.
303 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47; Key PubAs, 945 F.2d at 512-15; EAGLE TON, supra note
163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67,1008-11.
366 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47,362-63; Key Publ'ns, 945 F.2d at 512-15; Enc.t.grotkr, su-
pra note 163, at 113,129-30,136.138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67,1008-11.
307 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47, 362-63; Key PubFns, 945 F.24 at 512-15; EAGLE TON. Sit-
pea note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67,1008-11.
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309 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47, 362-63; Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3(1 at 1076-77; EAGI.E.•oN, su-
pra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67,1008-11.
31° See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47, 362-63; Els-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076-77; EAGLETON, su-
pra note 163, at 113,129-30,136,138; Litman, supra note 10, at 965-67,1008-11.
311 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47, 362-63; Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076-77.
312 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47,362-63; Els-Hokin, 225 F.3(1 at 1076-77,
313 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47, 362-63; Els-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076-77,
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The outcomes of these two cases illustrate why a stricter standard
is appropriate for a post-Romantic age. 914 However, opposition to
Romantic permissiveness does not entail or require a complete accep-
tance of modern theory's antisubjectivism, which erases the author by
merging him or her into the work. 915 Indeed, the antiauthorial strain
of modern theory is incompatible with the very existence of copyright
law, insofar as copyright protection could not exist without authors to
protect in the first place.916 Since its theoretical basis undermines the
essential function of copyright, pure antisubjectivism necessarily fails
to fully articulate copyright law's approach to originality, just as the
weaknesses of intentionalism and formalism preclude either school
from offering an overarching explication of arts° Judges, then,
should employ aesthetic pragmatism in originality cases. 318 Contem-
porary theory's erasure of the author should not function as an un-
criticized basis for rethinking originality, but the modern understand-
ing of authorship would effectively counter the underlying Romantic
bias of originality jurisprudence." 9 This approach would correct the
excesses of both Romantic subjectivism and contemporary antiautho-
rialism."°
By restricting the realm of propertized works to those that are
truly original, this approach would reinvigorate the public domain. 321
Unoriginal items that otherwise would be "fenced off' would now be
open to public access and debate. 922 As more people encounter and
appreciate works, individuals' reservoirs of "the raw materials of
authorship" would grow, thereby providing them with greater means
to express their creative ambitions." 3 By enlarging the public domain,
314 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-47,362-63; Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076-77; Krtv Pubros, 945
F.2d at 512-13; EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Litman, supra note 10,
at 965-67,1008-09.
315 See EAGLETON, SUM note 163, at 113,129-30,136,138.
MO See id.
MI See id.; Yen, supra note 31, at 260,299.
513 SeeYen, supra note 31, at 301-02.
!19
	 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Sarong, Ill U.S. at 60; Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03,
104-05; EAGLETON, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-
67; Yen, supra note 31, at 260,299,301-02.
320 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50; Smarty, 111  U.S. at 60; Catalda, 101 12tI at 102-03,
104-05; EAGLEToN, supra note 163, at 113, 129-30, 136, 138; Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-
67; Yen, supra note 31, at 260,299,301-02.
321 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Lange, supra note 12, at 165; Litman, supra
note 10, at 067-68; Travis, supra note 12, at 850-51.
522 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Lange, supra note 12, at 165; Litman, SUP"
note 10, at 967-68; TraNis, supra note 12, at 850-51.
523 See Litman, supra note 10, at 967-68.
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then, this approach would foster the flourishing of the arts, which,
after all, is the fundamental purpose of copyright. 524 However, the law
would continue to further the critical public interest in protecting
truly original works of art, as opposed to obvious, ordinary prod-
ucts. 325
CONCLUSION
The law's standard for originality reflects an uncritical deference
toward authorial subjectivity. Critics have persuasively demonstrated
how originality jurisprudence reflects the historically contingent logic
of the Romantic understanding of authorship, according to which the
author expresses an original, creative selfhood that is not mediated by
non-subjective entities or experiences. In contrast, modern opinion
recognizes the fact that any individual's experiences are conditioned,
influenced, and mediated by external factors such as language, gen-
der, and historical milieu.
Type II criticism of the Romantic model resolves an apparent
tension in this area of law—while the law operates with a bias toward
great, Romantic authors, the originality standard is remarkably low,
leading to copyright protection for almost any work that is produced
by an individual. By assuming that a work contains the imprint of a
purely subjective, originating consciousness, the law has extended
copyright protection to arguably nonoriginal works. Conversely, the
more appropriate, modern view, typified by Feist, entails judicial en-
quiry into the creativity of the work, which inevitably engenders a
stricter standard for originality. By restoring substance to the original-
ity requirement, this approach would not only reflect the contempo-
rary understanding of authorship, but would further the critical pol-
icy goal of reinvigorating the public domain.
RYAN LITTRELL
321 See Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 326; Litman, supra note 10, at 967-68; Yen,
supra note 31, at 248.
325 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 1466-67; Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 326; Yen,
supra note 31, at 248.
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